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During periods of concern about the content of television programming,
Congress often threatens to legislate standards. In response to such threats,
the entertainment industry has often adopted its own standards. Mr. Corn-
Revere suggests that this raises First Amendment concerns: The threat of
legislation can limit free speech as much as actual legislation.
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Introduction
What if the government decided that the practice of religion is in some
way contrary to the national interest? Suppose it concluded that religion is the
opiate of the masses, that the "seventh day of rest" is a drag on the national
economy, that TV evangelists bilk the uneducated of their meager earnings,
or that sectarian disputes contribute to social unrest and violence. An unlikely
scenario, certainly, but what if it happened?
tPartner, Hogan & Hartson, Washington, D.C.; Former Chief Counsel to Chairman James H.
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Government officials could give speeches setting out these positions, to
be sure, but could they do more? Would it be permissible, for example, for
key lawmakers to threaten punitive legislation if the National Council of
Churches did not announce plans to close up shop? Could top Administration
officials stage back-room meetings with church leaders to jawbone for change
that would be consistent with the new policy? And, at the end of all this, could
the President appear in a Rose Garden ceremony with the heads of the major
denominations and minor sects to announce that for the good of the nation the
parties had voluntarily agreed to phase out religion in America?
Of course this could never happen. Americans would never tolerate such
a frontal assault on cherished First Amendment freedoms. But why do
Americans seem to feel differently about the third and fourth clauses of the
First Amendment, which command that "Congress shall make no law .. .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press?" For some reason, the public
is not outraged when the government uses heavy-handed tactics to curtail
freedom of expression. In fact, a survey by the Times-Mirror Center of the
People and the Press reported that fifty-two percent of respondents favored
governmental restrictions on televised portrayals of "unnecessary violence."'
No one knows for certain why most Americans appear to favor increased
regulation of speech. Paul McMasters, Executive Director of the Freedom
Forum First Amendment Center, has suggested that "when it comes right down
to it," most people do not believe in free speech.' Or perhaps it is simply that
every act of censorship has its constituents.' Or, in the case of televised
violence, maybe Hillary Rodham Clinton is correct that an over-emphasis on
crime stories in television news coverage has created exaggerated fears of
violence in society.4
This Essay, in Part I, examines both historical and current efforts to
curtail violence on television. Part I also describes various types of informal
regulation of speech. Part II describes how courts have in some cases restricted
the government's ability to apply such informal pressure. Part III discusses an
important application of this jurisprudence to the FCC's "family viewing
policy" of the mid-1970s. This Essay is not intended to suggest that
1. COMM. DAILY, March 16, 1994, at 4.
2. Id.
3. See Steve Twomey, TV Fans Get Panned, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1994, at Cl ("Think of
America as a neighborhood homeowners' association, but on a massive scale: Anyone different living
among us must be crushed.")
4. Hillary Clinton Decries Excess Violence in TV News, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Mar. 14,
1994, at 47. This concern was supported by a recent study conducted by the Center for Media and
Public Affairs. It found that the three networks doubled their coverage of crime and violence during the
past year even though the national crime rate has not changed. See Ellen Edwards, Networks Make
Crime Top Story: Survey Says Courage Fanned Public Fear, WASH. POST, March 3, 1994, at Cl. See





government jawboning for communications industries to "clean up their act"
necessarily creates a constitutional problem. But it can, and it has done so on
enough occasions to belie the complacency of some federal policymakers who
appear to believe that any concession they can wring out of regulated industries
is permissible so long as it can be characterized as voluntary.
I. The Recurring Campaign Against Television Violence
The American public's general tolerance for censorship has created a
ritual in American politics: a responsible group of organizations announces that
some medium or message poses a threat to society, or at least to vulnerable
segments of the population, and seeks to have that bad influence curtailed. The
campaign is then picked up by public officials who either pass laws or use their
bully pulpit to convert any doubters. In the period after World War III, there
was great concern with the impact of cinema, particularly with its depictions
of sex and violence.' In the 1940s there was great concern over crime
magazines, with their emphasis on "bloodshed, lust or crime." Such
publications were believed to encourage or incite social violence.6 In the
1950s, this concern was focused on comic books, with Senate hearings
investigating the supposed link between violent comics and juvenile
delinquency.7 Of course, there have been continuing campaigns against
obscenity, broadcast indecency, rock music, gangsta rap, and, most recently,
video games.
In this long history of censorship, perennial campaigns against television
violence have appeared with the regularity of the thirteen-year locust. Senate
Judiciary Committee hearings on juvenile delinquency in the mid-1950s and
early 1960s examined the effects of television on young people; in the mid-
1970s, both Congress and the FCC again expressed concerns about depictions
of violence on TV.' This culminated in the creation of the "family viewing
policy" in which the networks and the National Association of Broadcasters
5. To head off legislation by the states to allow film censorship, Hollywood established the
Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America, headed by former Postmaster General Will H.
Hays. The Hays office was set up to be the "industry's own censorship bureau." A study of censors
in 1928 found that 56.4 percent of deletions related to depictions of crime. See Thomas G.
Krattenmaker& L.A. Powe, Televised Violence: First Amendment Principles and Social Science Theory,
64 VA. L. REv. 1123, 1289 (1978).
6. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510-11 (1948).
7. Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). The campaign against comic books led to the voluntary
creation of the Comic Book Code. Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 5, at 1291.
8. See Report on the Broadcast of Volent, Indecent, and Obscene Material, 51 F.C.C.2d 418
(1975).
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(NAB) agreed to move violent and sexually-oriented programming to the later
evening hours .
The campaign against television violence has been renewed in the past two
years and has taken on a heightened urgency.1" High level officials of the
Executive Branch, key lawmakers, and FCC officials have all identified the
issue as a top priority. At least ten bills were introduced in the 103d Congress
to control televised violence, and policymakers have urged the industry to
9. See generally Writers' Guild of America, West v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976),
vacated and remanded on jurisdictional grounds sub nom. Writers Guild of America, West v. American
Broadcasting Co., Inc., 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
10. The concern is driven by the conviction that television viewing, particularly by young people,
leads to greater violence in real life. Some, including the current Chairman of the FCC, have suggested
that there no longer is any scientific debate about whether TV viewing causes violence, and for
policymaking purposes the proposition has been accepted as fact. See FCC Chairman Reed E. Hundt,
Speech before the American Psychological Association Annual Convention (Aug. 13, 1994). Although
it is beyond the scope of this essay to debate the scientific literature on televised violence, it should be
noted that most social science studies of the subject have found no connection between television
viewing and violence. The few studies that reported a link generally found a very weak correlation
between viewing and behavior. And any possible effect attributable to children's TV viewing is greatly
overshadowed by other factors, such as rejection by parents, harsh discipline or lack of supervision.
For excellent reviews of the social science literature, see MARCIA PALLY, SEX & SENSIBILITY 87-115
(1994); Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 5.
Vol. 12:187, 1995
Television Violence
engage in voluntary self-regulation." At a broadcast industry convention in
1994, FCC Chairman Reed Hundt praised efforts by the broadcast and cable
industries to regulate themselves. He described the cable industry's support
for a system of ratings, independent monitoring, and technological controls as
"a watershed event," and the networks' acceptance of monitoring as the
"beginning of a breakthrough." While Chairman Hundt noted the commitment
of independent broadcast stations to use programming guidelines and to provide
advisory messages, he also added: "I know that you recognize that you have
not fully addressed the problem."2
Other officials have been more direct. Attorney General Janet Reno
testified last fall that the proposed legislation on televised violence would be
constitutional and stated that "the time has come for a very specific proposal
to be made by all aspects of the industry with immediate deadlines and means
of monitoring compliance." If the industry decides not to act, the Attorney
General added, then "Government will have no alternative but to address these
11. S. 2136, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (Federal Advertisement Reform Act), would prohibit
sponsorship of television programs by federal government agencies. S. 943, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) (Children's Television Violence Protection Act), would require warnings prior to programming
depicting "violence or unsafe gun practices." S. 973, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Television Violence
Report Card Act), would require the FCC to evaluate and publicly report on violence contained in TV
programs. S. 1383, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Children's Protection from Violent Programming
Act), would prohibit the telecast of violent programming at times when children are likely to be in the
broadcast audience. S. 1556, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) would require oversight of violent
commercials and program promotions. H.R. 2609, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Presidential
Commission on TV Violence and Children Act), would create a presidential commission to investigate
and propose solutions to reduce broadcasting of violence on television. H.R. 2756, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993) (Parents Television Empowerment Act), would require the FCC to establish a toll free
telephone number to collect complaints regarding televised violence. H.R. 2837, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) (Television and Radio Program Violence Reduction Act), would require the FCC to prescribe
standards to reduce violent programming on broadcast stations and cable systems and would require
license revocation for repeated violations. H.R. 2888, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Television
Violence Reduction Through Parental Empowerment Act), would require new television sets to be
equipped with circuitry to block the transmission of violent programs (the so-called "V-chip").
With a shift to Republican control of Congress, the 104th Congress appears less likely to
emphasize the issue of television violence. Senator Larry Pressler, the new Chairman of the
Communications Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee has reportedly said that he opposes
legislative approaches to control TV programming. See Pressler Asks Concentrated Effort to Pass
Telecom Bill, Comm. DAILY, Nov. 21, 1994, at 2. It is worth noting however, that certain legislative
proposals of the 103d Congress were sponsored or co-sponsored by Republican Members. H.R. 2888,
for example, which would require V-chip technology, was co-sponsored by Rep. Jack Fields, the new
Chairman of the House Telecommunications Subcommittee. Additionally, former Chairman Markey,
who will continue as the ranking minority member of the Subcommittee, has pledged to continue
advocating the V-chip. See Markey Looks to Maintain Agenda in New Role, COMM. DAILY, Dec. 2,
1994, at 4. On February 2, 1995, Sen. Conrad of North Dakota introduced the Children's Media
Protection Act of 1995. S. 332, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. Among other things, the Act would require V-
chip technology, a ratings system for broadcast and cable television content, and a prohibition on
transmission of "programming that contains gratuitous violence" between 6 AM and 10 PM. Id.
12. FCC Chairman Reed Hundt, Speech before the NATPE/INTV Convention (January 24,
1994).
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problems through legislation." She said that she wanted to see a reduction in
violent programming within "one year's time."13
At the same hearing, Senator Paul Simon of Illinois gave the networks
until January 1, 1994, to reduce the amount of violence in their
programming." In a speech before the National Press Club, Senator Simon
emphasized the deadline and warned that "the threat hangs like Damocles'
sword over programmers' necks." He added that "there is a line in the sand,
and I think the line in the sand will be a monitoring committee." Without some
"positive response" from the industry in setting up a monitoring group, he
said, "there will be a legislative effort."" s
In another hearing, former Surgeon General Joycelyn Elders blamed
television violence for a rise in real violence and urged the industry to change
its programming.' 6 The former Surgeon General also complained that the
networks had failed in their promise to air parental advisories for programs
containing violent content. "The networks obviously did not do what they said
they were going to do," she testified. 7
As the policy debate over televised violence has progressed, there has
been no shortage of specific proposals about what steps the television industry
should take. In a private meeting with network officials, Attorney General
Reno reportedly advocated a 6 to 9 p.m. safe harbor and called for "at least
six hours of inspirational programming."" s In another setting, she described
the type of television programming she would like to see. She gave the
example of a hypothetical show in which a teenager helped raise his siblings
13. See Reno Endorses Bills to Deal With TV Violence, CoMm. DAILY, October 21, 1993, at 2;
Kim McAvoy and Steve Coe, TV Rocked by Reno Ultimatum, BROADCASTING & CABLE, October 25,
1993, at 6. The Attorney General's blanket assessment of the constitutionality of various bills may have
been somewhat premature. Questioning revealed that her opinion was based entirely on the Supreme
Court's 1978 decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). She was uninformed about
subsequent court of appeals decisions striking down FCC safe harbor rules similar to some of the
legislative proposals. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991),
cen. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281 (1992) (hereinafter ACT II) (24-hour indecency ban rejected); Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (hereinafter ACT I) (12 a.m. to 6 a.m.
safe harbor period rejected). Moreover, it is not entirely clear that precedent on the narrow question
of broadcast indecency would necessarily extend to the issue of violence or to other media, such as
cable. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Video Software Dealer's Association v.
Webster, 968 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1992).
14. Reno Endorses Bills to Deal With TV iolence, COMM. DAILY, October 21, 1993, at 2.
15. Brook Boliek, Simon: TV's Response to Violence Issue Like.NRA, HOLLYWOOD REP.,
September 17, 1993.
16. See Elders Blasts TV for Causing Violence, WASH. AFRO-AMERICAN, November 6, 1993.
17. Christopher Scanlan, Networks 'Break Vows' on Violence: Critics Say TV Moguls Ignoring
Advisories, ARz. REPUBLIC, September 19, 1993, at El.
18. Joe Flint, Moriarty Quits, Blames Violence Backlash, BROADCASTING & CABLE, February




while his mother recovered from her drug problem. In the end, the mother
went to law school and the son graduated from high school as valedictorian. 9
The Attorney General is by no means the only federal official who has
made specific programming suggestions. Senator Simon told a group of
broadcasters that cartoons such as Tom and Jerry are too violent and that he
"would like to see a little less of that." On the other hand, a film such as
Schindler's List would be permissible so long as it is not aired "at eight o'clock
when a lot of kids are watching."20 Senator Ernest Hollings complained about
the violence level in the CBS sitcom Love and War in which the characters
throw popcorn at each other in a spoof on televised violence. Hollings
reportedly was disturbed by the ruckus and aired a film clip of the program
at a Senate hearing.
But while it may seem that every policymaker is a critic, few agree on
how television programming should be improved. Former Surgeon General
Elders has testified that presentations of violence should not be sanitized and
should realistically portray the consequences of such violence-"that you really
do bleed."21 Congressman Carlos Moorhead, on the other hand, objected to
programs in which "people are shot and get hurt and are writhing in pain,"
and concluded: "Cowboy movies were better."22 Senator John Kerry has cited
reality-based shows like Cops as being objectionable, while other lawmakers
have declined to differentiate between the various types of violent
programming. Senator John Danforth reportedly has stated: "Shakespeare,
Beavis and Butthead, Schwarzenegger, it's all the same."'
While the legislative proposals are matters of public record, the informal
plans for voluntary self-regulation are somewhat harder to track and are more
diverse. At a minimum, however, they have included the following demands:
(1) a rating system for violent programming; (2) independent monitors to
assess programming violence; (3) reduced levels of violence on TV; (4) a safe
harbor until either 9 or 10 p.m. during which time unacceptable violence
would not be presented; (5) the airing of parental advisories to warn of violent
programming; (6) increased presentation of pro-social programming; (7) fewer
violent cartoons; (8) fewer violent reality shows; (9) more graphic portrayals
of violence; and (10) less graphic portrayals of violence.
In response, both the broadcast and cable industries have announced self-
regulation plans. In February, the cable industry agreed to: (1) adopt a
violence rating system; (2) employ an outside monitor to assess violent
19. Hanna Rosin, The Producers: Congress Fights TV Violence, THE NEw REPUBLIC, December
13, 1993, at 12.
20. Kim McAvoy, Washington Watch, BROADCASTING & CABLE, March 7, 1994, at 58.
21. See Rosin, supra note 19.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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programming; (3) alter scheduling practices to move violent programs to a time
slot later in the evening; (4) adopt standards and practices for programming
and employ parental advisories; (5) limit the presentation of violence in
promotional advertising; (6) conduct a viewer education program; and (7)
present programming to address the issue of violence in society.24 The
networks agreed on their own to provide parental advisories to warn viewers
about violent programs, present more pro-social programming, devote
additional news coverage to the issue of violence, employ public service
announcements and, like the cable initiative, commission an outside expert to
conduct an annual qualitative assessment of the amount and type of violence
on network shows.
These efforts apparently appeased some lawmakers. Senator Simon
announced that industry efforts showed promise and that no legislation would
be needed-at least not this term. Others, however, were less impressed.
Congressman Edward Markey, for example, sponsor of the so-called V-chip
bill, said that "[u]nless the broadcasting industry accepts some rating system
along with some sort of violence-chip block voluntarily, I don't believe
legislation is avoidable."25 Similarly, Senator Hollings, whose bill would
prohibit violent programs at times when children are likely to be watching, said
that industry efforts were not adequate and that he would continue to press for
legislation. It remains to be seen the extent to which the television industry will
engage in further self-regulation.
So what, exactly, is the problem? One view is that these events represent
the system at its best, with policymakers identifying and solving a problem
without having to adopt a law. What possible constitutional objection could
there be if no law is actually passed? After all, legislators and other federal
officials merely have given speeches and debated proposals that clearly are
within their jurisdiction. How could anyone object to the fact that they are
merely performing their lawful duties?
II. The Jurisprudence of Informal Censorship: The First Amendment
The answer to these questions, to the extent there is one, is embedded in
the fundamental nature of First Amendment rights. Considering the
hypothetical question posed at the beginning of this Essay, most Americans
presumably would be outraged at governmental efforts-even informal ones-to
restrict the practice of religion. The constitutional infirmity could be even more
serious in the absence of official action, because there would be no record to
determine whether Congress had actually found ajustification sufficient to limit
24. NCTA Press Release, Cable Networks Announce Voices Against Violence (February 1, 1994).
25. Ellen Edwards, Broadcast and Cable TVto Name Violence Monitors, WASH. POST, Febnlay




fundamental rights. Nor would there be an adequate standard by which to
conduct judicial review, since there would be no law against which to assess
conduct. Some may feel that hypothetical restrictions on religion inflate the
importance of the question. We are dealing, after all, with TV shows, not the
Vatican. Should the analysis be different when the target of the government's
wrath is mere entertainment programming?
So far, the courts have answered this question in the negative. For
example, in Winters v. New York,26 the Supreme Court invalidated a state law
that curbed the publication of magazines "devoted principally to criminal news
and stories of bloodshed, lust or crime." In striking down the law, the Court
pointedly stated: "What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine.
Though we can see nothing of any possible value to society in these magazines,
they are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of
literature."27 In a more recent case invalidating restrictions on videotape
rentals to minors, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held, first,
that violent video programming to be "entitled to the highest degree of First
Amendment protection," and second, that it "cannot be regulated in the same
way as broadcast indecency."28
But there is still the need to define the relevant constitutional standard
when the government acts informally rather than through passage of a law. In
this regard, it is vital to understand that abridgement of free speech does not
always require an official government decree, injunction or licensing decision.
Less formal governmental actions can also have the effect of burdening or
otherwise limiting speech. Such actions manifest themselves in a wide variety
of ways.
In Lombard v. Louisiana,29 for example, the Supreme Court held that
speeches given by executive branch officials can have "at least as much
coercive effect as an ordinance."3" In Lombard, the mayor and police
superintendent had made widely publicized statements that no sit-in
demonstrations would be permitted in the city. Subsequently, when civil rights
demonstrators were arrested for trespassing in violation of the public
pronouncements, the Court overturned the convictions. It brushed aside the
assertions by local officials that sit-in demonstrations were not in the public
interest of the community, and held that informal statements "must be treated
exactly as if [the city] had an ordinance prohibiting such conduct."3" The
26. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
27. Id. at 510-11.
28. See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting
Sovereign News Co. v. Falke, 448 F. Supp. 306, 394 (N.D. Ohio 1977)).
29. 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
30. Id. at 273.
31. Id.
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Court ruled that the government could not be permitted to do indirectly what
it was barred from doing directly.
That same year, the Court decided Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,3 2 a
paradigmatic example of informal censorship. There, the Rhode Island
legislature established an advisory committee called the Rhode Island
Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth. Members of the Commission
would notify bookstores that certain books and magazines were considered
objectionable for sale or display to youths under the age of 18. The written
notice included a reminder that the Commission also had a mandate to
recommend prosecution for purveyors of obscenity. Soon after the
Commission's notice was sent, a local policeman visited bookstores to
determine what action they took in response, if any. The Supreme Court
described the Commission's practice as "blacklist[ing]," and found that
"informal censorship may sufficiently inhibit the circulation of publications to
warrant injunctive relief."33 The Court discounted the Commission's claim
that it was only providing legal advice, concluding that "the Commission
deliberately set about to achieve the suppression of publications deemed
'objectionable' and succeeded in its aim. " '
This does not mean, however, that the government is powerless to
categorize different types of speech. In Meese v. Keene, the Court upheld the
government's authority to label films as "political propaganda" under the
Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938. 3' The Court, in assessing the claim
of a California state legislator that the official designation impeded his ability
to exhibit three Canadian films dealing with environmental issues and with
nuclear war, found that use of the term "political propaganda" threatened the
appellee with "cognizable injury" and not just a "subjective chill."36 But
while this finding was sufficient to confer standing, the Court said it was a
"separate matter" whether it rose to the level of a constitutional infirmity. 3"
The Court held that there was no First Amendment violation on the facts
presented because the term "propaganda" was used in a neutral sense in the
statute and because there was no demonstration that the designation had any
actual adverse impact on the distribution of foreign advocacy materials.3' This
holding, however, falls far short of approving governmental actions undertaken
32. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
33. Id. at 67-68 (footnote omitted).
34. Id. at 67. The Court found that the Commission's practices plainly served as instruments of
regulation independent of the law against obscenity. Id. at 68-69 (footnote omitted).
35, 481 U.S. 465, 467 (1987). Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
36. Id. at 473.
37. Id. at 479 n.14.
38. Id. at 484. The Court expressly disavowed any decision on the permissible scope of
Congress' right to speak.
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with the intent and having the effect of substantially curtailing a publication's
circulation.
Nevertheless, the facts of Keene suggest that the government may employ
a wide variety of tactics that can have the effect of discouraging speech. In this
regard, official investigations historically have served as an effective means
of "off-the-books" censorship. Although the courts generally accord broad
deference to such investigations, there are constitutional limits to government
inquiries. This issue typically arose in cases involving investigations of
subversive activities in which the government's investigative power was
upheld. In Barrenblatt v. United States,39 for example, the Supreme Court
held that there was no First Amendment right to refuse to testify before the
House Committee on Un-American Activities.' In the circumstances
presented in that case, the Court held that the legitimate congressional inquiry
outweighed the free speech interest involved.4
Although the Court typically has upheld the ability to investigate, it also
has made clear that "[n]o inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and
in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress. "42 Moreover,
"[i]nvestigations conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of the
investigators or to 'punish' those investigated are indefensible. "' Thus, the
Court generally requires that investigations be conducted in pursuit of a
legitimate legislative objective and within the scope of a valid authorizing
resolution." There must be a substantial relation between the governmental
interest and the inquiry, and the interest must outweigh the First Amendment
interests involved. In Watkins v. United States, for example, the Court struck
down a contempt of Congress conviction on the argument that a vague
authorizing resolution deprived Watkins of due process.4' The Court has also
stressed that "an essential prerequisite to the validity of an investigation which
intrudes into the area of constitutionally protected rights of speech, press,
association and petition [is] that the State convincingly show a substantial
relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and
compelling state interest."' Under this requirement, the Court invalidated
39. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
40. Id. at 134.
41. Id. at 126-28. See also Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
42. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
43. Id.
44. See Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175, 1182 (D.D.C. 1970) ("If a report has no
relationship to any existing or future proper legislative purpose and is issued solely for sake of exposure
or intimidation, then it exceeds the legislative function of Congress.").
45. See Watkins, 354 U.S. at 209.
46. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963); cf Deutch
v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 467-68 (1961) (questions asked must also be pertinent to topic of
inquiry).
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a state legislative committee's attempts to inquire into NAACP membership
lists in order to ferret out suspected Communists.47
To whatever extent such constitutional safeguards have been speech-
protective, their effectiveness has depended on the scope of appropriate
congressional concern. Where legislative power is more expansive, the ability
to conduct investigations similarly is enlarged. Consequently, Congress has
greater power to inquire into the content of the electronic media, which are
subject to more intrusive regulations than traditional publishers.
Like the congressional concern with subversive speech in the 1950s and
early 1960s, legislative interest in broadcast programming has generated a
large number of hearings over the years. Through its power to investigate
purported abuses, Congress has examined numerous broadcast practices
including the content of various network documentaries, news coverage of the
1968 Democratic National Convention, violent and sexually-oriented programs,
coverage of Olympic games, and the broadcast of election projections.4" Such
investigations often have taken place without regard to any apparent connection
to legislative action. In fact, "congressional committees have often investigated
individual programs with the apparent purpose of publicly castigating
broadcasters rather than of enacting legislation. " 4 Given the extent of
government control over broadcast licensing, such inquiries have led
broadcasters to alter their programming.50 Consequently, "few doubt that
congressional investigations have a significant impact on broadcasters.""
In addition to the stick of occasional investigations, government may also
hold out the carrot of various benefits to keep regulated industries in line. For
example, a number of legislators, including Congressman Markey, threatened
to withhold passage of broadcast hearing reform legislation in response to
criticism by radio talk shows of a Congressional pay raise.52 Of course,
where the government can offer sufficient benefits, it may be able to affect
even the practices of unregulated industries. In 1985, for example, a Senate
47. Gibson, 372 U.S. at 546.
48. See generally Timothy B. Dyk and Ralph E. Goldberg, The First Amendment and
Congressional Investigations of Broadcast Programming, 3 J.L. & PoL., 625, 630-31 (1987).
49. Id. at 630.
50. The so-called "family viewing policy," which ultimately was invalidated in court, arose from
a report of the House Appropriations Committee that "required the FCC to outline the ways in which
it would deal with violent and sexually-oriented programming. Id. at 636. See Writers Guild of
America, West v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976), vacated and remanded on jurisdictional
grounds sub nom. Writers Guild of America, West v. ABC, 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 824 (1980).
The major networks also limited their use of exit polling during election news reports to
accommodate congressional concerns. Dyk and Goldberg, supra note 48, at 635-36 n.48.
51. Dyk and Goldberg, supra note 48, at 638. See also David L. Bazelon, FCC Regulation of
the Telecommunication Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213, 215-17 (1975) (detailing the effectiveness of
informal content controls in the case of broadcasting).




Subcommittee conducted hearings on "indecent" rock music and record
labelling.53 Although no regulation was proposed, at least one witness pointed
out that the hearings coincided with Congressional consideration of record
piracy legislation that would benefit the recording industry.54 At the same
time, the President of the Recording Industry Association of America
announced that twenty-four of its member companies had "reached consensus"
regarding a record labelling proposal in response to content concerns. 55 Even
newspaper publishers have acknowledged altering their editorial activities in
order to obtain government benefits. In 1988, while awaiting Justice
Department approval of an antitrust exemption, the editor and publisher of the
Detroit Free Press admitted rejecting editorial cartoons critical of former
Attorney General Edwin Meese.56
Such tactics have been particularly prominent in the quest to reduce
television violence. In 1991, for example, former FCC Chairman Alfred Sikes
urged broadcasters to alter their programming as a prerequisite to further
deregulation of ownership and business practices. After referring to
congressional enactments relating to televised violence, "indecent"
programming and children's programming, the Chairman said that "there is
a tacit-if not explicit-linkage between necessary reforms that would help
broadcasting compete, and Congress' attitude toward your programming.""
More recently, Congressman Markey informed one witness at a hearing
that broadcasters would be unlikely to receive favorable consideration in
legislation to reform communications infrastructure unless the industry
supported his "V-chip" proposal.58 He has described broadcasting regulation
as a "social compact" based on an explicit "quid pro quo."5 9 Thus,
Congressman Markey emphasized that any effort to review current restrictions
on broadcast ownership must "affirmatively address both halves of the social
53. See Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). The hearings represented nothing more than a congressional expression of
concern. No legislation was considered.
54. See id. at 53 (statement of Frank Zappa) ("Is it proper that the husband [then-Senator Albert
Gore] of a [Parent's Music Resource Center founder] sits on any committee considering business
pertaining to the blank tape tax or his wife's lobbying organization?").
55. Id. at 95 (statement of Stanley M. Gortikov). RIAA members account for approximately 85
percent of the sales of prerecorded music in the United States.
56. Newspaper Tells of 'Cautious' Stance on Meese, WASH. POST, July 21, 1988, at A21. See
also Stephen R. Barnett, Newspapers Wither as Monopolies Blossom, LEGAL TIMEs, October 23, 1989,
at 20, 22 (detailing additional changes in news coverage). The newspaper was seeking a joint operating
agreement that would permit consolidation with the business operations of the Detroit News.
57. Remarks of Alfred C. Sikes before the International Radio & Television Society, Waldorf-
Astoria Hotel, New York (September 19, 1991). See FCC Chief Says Broadcasters Should Clean Up
Act if They Want Government Help, Associated Press, September 23, 1991, available in LEXIS, News
Library, AP file.
58. See COMM. DAILY, Feb. 3, 1994, at 1-2. Markey reportedly told McGraw-Hill Broadcasting
President Edward Reilly that it is "difficult for broadcasters to claim that they will use the new spectrum
for the public interest when they are unwilling to use a scintilla of spectrum for V-chips." Id.
59. Rep. Edward Markey, Remarks at Broadcasting and Cable Interface VIII (October 4, 1994).
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compact" and include a strengthening of children's TV programming rules,
violence limits and a greater commitment to minority programming.' FCC
Chairman Hundt similarly has described the government/broadcaster
relationship as a social compact, and has warned that if broadcasters fail to
meet their responsibilities to admit "the real impact of TV violence" and to
take steps to deal with it, then "America will ask what broadcasters are giving
back to the public that justifies their deal."61
III. The FCC's Family Viewing Policy: Writers' Guild of
America, West v. FCC
To assess whether the government's campaign to reduce television
violence represents an excessive intrusion into First Amendment rights, it is
vital to recognize that this precise question has been addressed before. In the
mid-1970s broadcasters adopted the "family viewing policy" as a result of a
concerted effort by Congress and the FCC. Then-Chairman Richard Wiley,
pursuant to a congressional directive, initiated a series of meetings with
network, independent television, and NAB officials "to serve as a catalyst for
the achievement of meaningful self-regulatory reform."62 As part of this
initiative, the Chairman' outlined four specific proposals for broadcasters to
consider: (1) making a new commitment to reducing the level and intensity of
violent and sexually-oriented material; (2) scheduling more adult-oriented
programming after 9 p.m.; (3) airing video and audio warnings before and
during programs with violent or sexual content; and (4) publishing warnings
in advance television programming listings.63 The Chairman's message was
amplified in speeches before broadcast groups and in suggestions to the press
that public hearings would be convened if voluntary action was not
forthcoming.' The FCC's "suggestions" were adopted by the networks and
were to be enforced through the NAB Code. The self-regulation program was
adopted just in time for the FCC to report to Congress on the status of
televised sex and violence.
In a lawsuit brought by writers and producers of television programs, the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California invalidated the policy.
The court held that "[tihe existence of threats, and the attempted securing of
60. Id.
61. FCC Chairman Reed E. Hundt, Speech before the American Psychological Association
Annual Convention (Aug. 13, 1994); Chairman Reed E. Hundt, Speech before the International Radio
and Television Society (Oct. 19, 1994).
62. Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, and Obscene Material, 51 F.C.C.2d 418, 420
(1975).
63. Id. at 420-21.
64. Writers Guild of America, West v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976), vacated and
remanded on jurisdictional grounds sub nom. Writers Guild of America, West v. ABC, 609 F.2d 355
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
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commitments coupled with the promise to publicize noncompliance . . .
constituted per se violations of the First Amendment."65 The informal nature
of the government's actions heightened the court's concern. To the extent the
Commission sought to control entertainment programming, the court ordered
that "it shall do so not in closed-door negotiating sessions but in conformity
with legislatively mandated administrative procedures."66  The court
characterized the FCC's tactics as "backroom bludgeoning,"67 and found them
to be in violation of the First Amendment, the Communications Act, and the
Administrative Procedure Act.6"
The District Court opinion was vacated on appeal because the Court of
Appeals concluded that the FCC should have been given the initial opportunity
to rule on the charges against it pursuant to the primary jurisdiction
doctrine.69 However, the appellate court agreed that "the use of these
techniques by the FCC presented serious issues involving the Constitution, the
Communications Act and the APA."7  The Supreme Court denied
certiorari, 7' and those "serious issues" remain open questions.
Some have suggested that these issues are not so serious, that the special
constitutional status of broadcasting allows the government broad discretion
to regulate televised violence. In particular, Attorney General Reno and FCC
Chairman Hundt have asserted that the decision in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation72 gives the FCC authority to regulate violent programming as well
as indecent content.73 Indeed, the aggressive tone of the current campaign
against violence stands in sharp contrast to the campaign twenty years ago. At
that time, the FCC expressed concern about involving the government "too
deeply in programming content, raising serious constitutional questions. " '
Accordingly, it stressed that "the decision as to which programs are so
excessively violent ... as to be inappropriate for young children would remain
in the broadcaster's sound discretion. "" Such cautionary language is
conspicuously absent from the current debate over violence.
Additionally, the complacent reliance on existing broadcast precedents
may be inappropriate. Leaving aside the fact that the constitutional ability to
enforce validly-promulgated indecency regulations does not necessarily justify
65. Id. at 1151.
66. Id. at 1073.
67. Id. at 1143. The court also held that the networks and NAB were liable for damages for
acting in concert with the government to suppress speech.
68. Id. at 1149-50, 1153.
69. 609 F.2d 355, 366 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
70. Id. at 365.
71. 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
72. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
73. See supra notes 10-13.
74. Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, and Obscene Material, 51 F.C.C.2d at 419.
75. Id. at 421.
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under the table rules, that indecent programming is not the same thing from
a constitutional perspective as violent material, or that Pacifica does not extend
to cable TV programming,76 the special status of broadcasting could well
make the government's campaign against violence even more vulnerable.
Broadcasters are special in that they are a licensed medium, and as such,
they are particularly susceptible to informal pressure in licensing proceedings.
This pressure, potentially, can have a chilling effect on speech. For this
reason, the D.C. Circuit struck down a requirement that noncommercial radio
stations make audio tapes of programs in which any "issue of public
importance" was presented.77  It found that both commercial and
noncommercial broadcasters are subject to "a variety of sub silentio pressures
and 'raised eyebrow' regulation of program content."" Accordingly, even
a seemingly neutral regulation could be invalid to the extent it increases the
likelihood that broadcasters "will censor themselves to avoid official pressure
and regulation. "
Twenty years ago, Judge David Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit described
the in terrorem effect of the regulatory scheme and concluded that "the use
of 'raised eyebrow' tactics presents serious issues which should at least engage
our undivided attention as we review communications policy and the
Constitution."" To underscore his concern, Judge Bazelon published White
House memoranda from the Watergate era. The documents outline the efforts
of the Nixon White House to use the FCC and other institutions to intimidate
the broadcast networks. An October 17, 1969 memorandum from Jeb
Magruder to H.R. Haldeman identified 21 requests from the President in a 30
day period "requesting specific action relating to what could be considered
unfair news coverage. "" Magruder had some ideas. Among them:
Begin an official monitoring system through the FCC as soon
as Dean Burch is officially on board as Chairman ... This
will have much more effect than a phone call from Herb
Klein or Pat Buchanan.
76. See Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1104-05 (D.
Utah 1985), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), aff'd mem. 480 U.S.
926 (1987); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1420 (1lth Cir. 1985); Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United
States, 835 F. Supp. 1, 9-10 (D.D.C. 1993); Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F.
Supp. 1164, 1170-71 (D. Utah 1982); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 987, 995 (D.
Utah 1982).
77. Community-Service Broadcasting of Mid-America, Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102, 1104 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (en banc).
78. Id. at 1116.
79. Id.
80. Bazelon, supra note 51, at 215-17.
81. Id. at 247.
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Use the anti-trust division to investigate various media relating
to anti-trust violations. Even the possible threat of anti-trust
action I think would be effective in changing their views in
the above matter.82
Similarly, Charles Colson was quite candid about the government's
intentions in a memo to H.R. Haldeman on September 25, 1970:
The networks are terribly nervous over the uncertain state of
the law, i.e., the recent FCC decisions and the pressures to
grant Congress access to TV. They are also apprehensive
about us. Although they tried to disguise this, it was obvious.
The harder I pressed them (CBS and NBC) the more
accommodating, cordial and almost apologetic they became
. . . They were startled by how. . . we have so thoroughly
monitored their coverage and our analysis of it . . . I think
we can dampen their ardor for putting on "loyal opposition"
type programs.83
During this same period the District Court in Writers' Guild found that
informal pressure tactics of the FCC at the behest of Congress were a per se
violation of the First Amendment." Although this conclusion was reopened
by the reviewing court's jurisdictional ruling, 5 the Commission's
constitutional authority to control programming content most certainly has
diminished in the intervening years.
As policymakers ponder whether to impose new content controls, it is
worth remembering that the constitutionality of broadcast regulation is not an
immutable fact; it is based on "'the present state of commercially acceptable
technology' as of 1969. "86 The Supreme Court has noted that "because the
broadcast industry is dynamic in terms of technological change[J,] solutions
adequate a decade ago are not necessarily so now, and those acceptable today
may well be outmoded 10 years hence."7 Both courts and commentators have
82. Id. at 248.
83. Id. at 244-47.
84. 423 F. Supp. at 1073-74.
85. Id. at 1073.
86. News America Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969)). See Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863,
867 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
87. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973).
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questioned the continuing validity of the scarcity rationale for the
constitutionality of regulating broadcast content."8
The Supreme Court thus far has avoided a direct reexamination of Red
Lion and other cases that apply "a less rigorous standard of First Amendment
scrutiny to broadcast regulation."89 But it has shown no enthusiasm for
preserving that line of precedent. Indeed, last summer in Turner Broadcasting
System v. FCC, the Court again declined to review the cases but also refused
to endorse them.9" The Court also minimized the potency of any government
jurisdiction over broadcast content. It noted the "minimal extent to which the
FCC and Congress actually influence the programming offered by broadcast
stations," and emphasized that "the FCC's oversight responsibilities do not
grant it the power to ordain any particular type of programming that must be
offered by broadcast stations.""' Nor may the government "impose upon
[broadcasters] its private notions of what the public ought to hear."92
In this context, an overtly aggressive campaign to reduce television
violence, whether official or informal, could cause the aging justifications for
broadcast content regulation to unravel. It is rather ironic that two decades ago,
when the constitutionality of such regulation was far more secure, public
officials seemed to be more circumspect, at least in their rhetoric. Now, as
regulatory justifications are fading away, the government is seeking to impose
a growing array of content controls, including children's programming
requirements, more stringent indecency enforcement, advertising limits, the
possibility of a renewed fairness doctrine, and so on. With the addition of
violence restrictions, perhaps the cumulative drag on editorial freedom will
trigger a long overdue judicial revisitation of broadcasters' constitutional status.
Conclusion
Last summer, Juliana's, a popular Tokyo disco featuring scantily-clad
dancers on raised platforms, closed its doors. The club's demise resulted from
government disapproval, although no law was ever passed, and no edict issued.
88. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364, 376-77 n.11
(1984); Arkansas AFL-CIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d 1430, 1142 (8th Cir. 1993) (Arnold, C.J., concurring);
News America Publishing, Inc., 844 F.2d at 811 ("The Supreme Court .. .has recognized that
technology may render the [scarcity] doctrine obsolete-indeed, may have already done so.");
Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 506-09 (D.C. Cit. 1986),
cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1005-06 (2d ed. 1988) ("reconsideration [of the scarcity argument for broadcast regulation] seems long
overdue. ").
89. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2456 (1994).
90. Id. ("the rationale for applying a less rigorous standard of First Amendment scrutiny to
broadcast regulation, whatever its validity in the cases elaborating it, does not apply in the context of
cable regulation.") (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 2463, 2464.
92. Id. at 2463 (quoting En Banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C.2d 2303, 2312 (1960)).
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Authorities had merely provided "guidance" to the owners about the
entertainment value of Juliana's. The closure underscored the "extraordinary
deference that Japanese business people tend to show toward government
officials. "' The episode raises the familiar tree-falling-in-the-woods question:
is a regulator really regulating when there is no regulation? Sometimes, the
answer is yes.
The United States, with its cultural diversity and First Amendment
protections, is not always profitably compared to the more rigid, command-
driven Japanese society. But in the case of raised eyebrow regulation of
licensed media in the United States, large industries often show extraordinary
deference to government officials' whims and preferences. While genuinely
voluntary decisions to make editorial changes that happen to coincide with
policy initiatives do not present a constitutional problem, they may do so when
the "volunteers" are given little alternative but to comply.
The current crusade against television violence is notable for the virtual
absence of sensitivity toward First Amendment values. Policymakers at the
highest levels of the federal government have summoned media executives to
Washington, expressed concerns about specific programs and have set
timetables for compliance with their demands. All the while, various legislative
and administrative proposals have, in the words of Senator Simon, hung "like
Damocles' sword over programmers' necks." Such rhetoric contrasts sharply
with the FCC's expressed concern in the 1970s that its family viewing policy
not intrude "too deeply in programming content, thus raising serious
constitutional questions. "9
The Commission's professed regard for the First Amendment did not
salvage the family viewing policy, even at a time when the government was
generally given great latitude in regulating broadcast content. Now, however,
as courts are becoming increasingly skeptical about the use of such regulatory
power, the relatively unvarnished sentiments of federal policymakers are
unlikely to play well if broadcasters and other media enterprises are strong-
armed into accepting a specific deal to limit programming content. Under such
circumstances, the courts should take steps to defend the Constitution and
defend cherished First Amendment freedoms from legislative and regulatory
assault.
93. Paul Blustein, Where the Go-Go Stopped, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1994, at BI.
94. Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, and Obscene Material, 51 F.C.C.2d, at 419.

